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How is radioactive material transported?
• More than half a million packages containing radioactive material are transported in Germany every year.
• The transports mainly contain radioactive material for measuring, research and medical purposes.
• With regard to transport it is vital that safety is guaranteed by the package itself.
• Under the regulations for the transport of dangerous goods, BASE is responsible for granting design approvals for transport packages.
The application of radioactive material in many areas of social life, such as medicine (diagnostics, therapy), technology (radiographic examinations), research, or energy production (nuclear fuel supply and waste management), often requires that this radioactive material be transported. Radioactive materials for measuring, research and medical purposes represent the major part of the transports. More than half a million packages containing radioactive material are transported in Germany every year.
However, the main focus of public attention is on the so-called "CASTOR transports". CASTOR is the abbreviation for "Cask for Storage and Transport of Radioactive Material", and denotes various types of casks. These casks are used, for example, for the transport and interim storage of spent fuel elements and high-level radioactive waste from the reprocessing of nuclear fuel.
Furthermore, such casks were used for the transport of spent fuel elements from German nuclear power plants to the reprocessing plants in France and Great Britain. Within the framework of the consensus agreement on the nuclear phase-out between the Federal Government and the energy utilities, the transports for reprocessing were discontinued on 30 June 2005.
“Safe package” concept
In transport, it is essential that safety is ensured by the package itself. This is based on the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which have been implemented worldwide in the legal regulations for the transport of radioactive materials.
The safety philosophy of the regulations on the transport of dangerous goods is based on the concept of the "safe package", which can largely be transported independent of the mode of transport, and with few operational and administrative measures. Depending on the type and quantity (hazard potential) of the radioactive material to be transported, safety-related requirements are thus placed on the package (packaging and contents) itself ("graduated" packaging requirements). These range from general requirements for exempted packages with very limited contents to accident-proof type B and type C packages with highly active radioactive material. CASTOR casks, for example, belong to the type B packages, the so-called "accident-proof packages". These casks must be able to withstand the effects of even the most severe accidents, while maintaining their safety function in terms of
containing the radioactive contents (leak tightness),
- limiting the external dose rate (shielding of radioactive radiation),
- dissipating the heat emitted by the content, and
- preventing the occurrence of a nuclear chain reaction (criticality safety).
Such type B packages are subject to approval by BASE. Fulfilment of the legally required type B properties of the casks must be demonstrated before official approval, using various methods such as original tests, model tests and theoretical proof.
Technical safety in the transport of radioactive materials is thus primarily ensured by the properties of the package.
Licencing of transport casks
Within the framework of dangerous goods legislation, the Federal Office for the Safety of Nuclear Waste Management (BASE) is responsible for issuing design approvals for transport casks. BASE examines radiological aspects such as radiation shielding and criticality safety.
Mechanical and thermal properties, leak tightness and quality assurance are independently assessed by the Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing (BAM) and confirmed through a test certificate. BASE will issue the licence on the basis of these two examinations.
Licensing of nuclear fuel transports
According to the Atomic Energy Act, BASE is also responsible for the licensing of transports of nuclear fuels and large sources. Transport licences are only granted if the provisions of nuclear law and dangerous goods law are complied with. More detailed information on the valid transport licences issued by BASE can be obtained from a summary table.
The supervision of nuclear fuel transports is regulated as follows:
- As far as road, inland waterway and sea transports are concerned, the supervision of nuclear fuel transports under nuclear and dangerous goods legislation is the responsibility of the Länder authorities.
- For air transports, the Länder authorities are also responsible for supervision under nuclear law, while the Federal Office of Civil Aeronautics is responsible for supervision under dangerous goods law.
- The Federal Railway Authority is responsible for nuclear and dangerous goods supervision of rail transports.
IT security in the transport of large sources
BASE is also responsible for issuing licences for the transport of large sources according to Sections 27 and 29 StrlSchG.
One prerequisite for issuing such a licence is that the necessary protection against disruptive actions or other interference by third parties (SEWD) is ensured. This includes, for example, acts of terrorism and sabotage with the aim of releasing radioactive substances, or attempts to steal radioactive material.
Further information is provided in the article on IT security in the transport of large sources.
State of 2022.12.09