The debate on a lifetime extension for nuclear power plants

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine gave rise to a new debate in Germany, about energy supply and the associated security of gas supply, among other things. Germany had so far been highly dependent on fossil fuels from Russia.

The Federal Cabinet adopted the draft for a 19th amendment to the Atomic Energy Act on 19 October 2022. The Bundestag passed the 19th amendment to the Atomic Energy Act on November 11, 2022, with 375 votes in favour, 216 against and 70 abstentions (661 votes cast). The bill that was passed created the conditions under nuclear law for a limited stretch-out operation of the Emsland, Isar 2 and Neckarwestheim 2 nuclear power plants.The adopted draft law created the prerequisites according to nuclear law for a limited stretch-out operation of the Emsland, Isar 2 and Neckarwestheim 2 nuclear power plants.

The draft law stipulates that only the fuel elements still available at the respective facilities are to be used for the further operation of the plants. The use of new fuel elements was not permitted. The power plants ceased power operation on 15 April 2023. Due to the short period of no more than three and a half months of additional power operation, no periodic safety review had been needed for continued operation. The state did not bear any costs for this stretch-out operation. The draft law was also approved by the Bundesrat at the end of November. To the BMUV press release (in German).

Background

Assessment of a lifetime extension

In the course of this debate, the Federal Government had examined at the beginning of March 2022 whether a lifetime extension of the three nuclear power plants currently still in operation in Germany would be feasible, and to what extent this extension could contribute to energy security. After weighing up the benefits and risks, the Federal Government initially rejected a runtime extension, even in view of the current gas crisis (click here to see the audit note of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection (BMWK) and BMUV (in German only)).

Stress test: Analysis of the power supply

The Federal Government had then commissioned a so-called stress test, which was carried out between mid-July and early September 2022. As part of this stress test, the four German transmission system operators analysed the prospects of the security of electricity supply in the coming winter under more stringent assumptions. In contrast to the audit note, security aspects were not the subject of the analysis.

The result, according to the BMWK, is that a several-hour crisis situation in the electricity system in the winter of 2022/23 is very unlikely, but cannot be completely ruled out at present. The decision of the Federal Cabinet dated 19 October 2022 is based on this stress test, among other things.

Focus on safety issues

According to the law, power plants would have to meet a higher safety level for a lifetime extension. What this actually looks like, and what measures and retrofits are necessary to continuously improve the nuclear safety of the plant, is normally determined by means of a periodic safety review.

Stricter requirements for the safety of nuclear power plants throughout Europe when issuing new licences have been in place since 2014. This is because our neighbours also have a right to the best possible protection from the dangers of German nuclear power plants.

What makes nuclear power a high-risk technology?

In a nuclear reactor, energy is produced by nuclear fission. The fission of an atomic nucleus produces up to 100,000,000 times more energy than a conventional combustion reaction. Complex safety concepts, systems and measures are required to control these large, concentrated amounts of energy. A serious accident with catastrophic consequences for humans and the environment due to loss of control over the power plant can never be completely ruled out. The goal of all safety measures is therefore to minimise the risk of accidents.

State-of-the-art in science and technology elementary for damage precautions

Analyses of previous reactor catastrophes, such as the one in Fukushima, have shown that severe nuclear accidents can also happen even though all parties involved are convinced that they have done everything possible to ensure the safety of the power plant and to exclude such a catastrophe. The analysis of the Fukushima reactor disaster in Japan showed that Japan had not been sufficiently prepared for the accident, because, until then, it had been widely assumed that such a catastrophic accident was unthinkable. The German Atomic Energy Act therefore requires that the respective valid safety architecture be critically scrutinised on a regular basis.

The requirements towards providing evidence of safety are continuously increasing, and must keep pace with scientific and technical developments. If new scientific findings deemed necessary for the protection of the population and the environment are not yet technically feasible, a renewed licence for the operation of a nuclear power plant, for example, may not be granted. For nuclear power plants in operation, technical adaptations to the latest developments in safety must be carried out every ten years by means of a periodic safety review. The aim is to continuously improve the nuclear safety of the plant. The requirements for nuclear power plants are thus higher than those for conventional power plants.

Continued operation: compromising safety?

An expert report recently commissioned by the Bavarian government on Isar 2 concluded that there would be no concerns whatsoever in the case of a lifetime extension of this nuclear power plant. The Federal Government, on the other hand, stated that the three remaining nuclear power plants could only continue to operate, if at all, with safety-related concessions. According to the law, the power plant would have to meet a higher safety level for a lifetime extension. What this actually looks like and what measures and retrofits are necessary to continuously improve the nuclear safety of the plant is determined by means of a periodic safety review. This would have been necessary for the Isar 2 NPP in 2019, but was suspended in view of the plant's shutdown at the end of 2022. Therefore, the aforementioned expert opinion on Isar 2 does not contain any statement on whether the power plant would also meet the higher safety level required for continued operation.

Since 2014, stricter requirements for the safety of nuclear power plants apply throughout Europe when issuing new licences. This is because our neighbours also have a right to the best possible protection from the dangers of German nuclear power plants.

War in Ukraine exacerbates safety situation of nuclear plants

Reactor catastrophes of the past decades have so far occurred in peacetime: The accidents in Western reactor types (Windscale in the UK in the 1950s, Harrisburg in the USA in 1979), the explosion of a Soviet-designed reactor in Chernobyl in 1986 and, finally, the reactor disaster in Fukushima in 2011. The latter led to the cross-party decision in Germany to phase out nuclear power by 2022. Following the events of 11 September 2001, it became clear that extreme terrorist activities can also pose concrete threats, which led to a tightening of security requirements for nuclear facilities. With Russia's attack on Ukraine, however, scenarios have occurred that were previously considered hardly realistic. The risk of catastrophic accidents has become even more acute.

Nuclear facilities are not designed against warlike attacks

With the war in Ukraine, civilian nuclear facilities have for the first time indirectly become the target of armed conflict. Nuclear facilities cannot be designed against this form of threat. Russia has made it clear that international rules prohibiting acts of war around nuclear power plants can only last as long as all actors feel bound by them. In such cases, nuclear plants will become a particular threat. In many nuclear states, the use of such facilities is also closely linked to military use. Military use, whether for nuclear weapons or shelling a facility, represents an increase in risks for a society.

Short-term benefits vs. increased security risks

Ultimately, the question as to whether short-term security of supply is valued more highly than the long-term and far-reaching protection of people and the environment is a socio-political one. From a technical point of view, the lifetime extension of a few reactors with an electricity share of 6 percent can ultimately make only a very small contribution to the energy supply.

Social risks

Moreover, extending the runtime of nuclear power plants also entails social risks. This is because the nuclear phase-out is the central basis for the search for a final repository for high-level radioactive waste in Germany, which was relaunched in 2017.

On the one hand, the decision to phase out nuclear power in 2011 clearly delimited the amount of waste to be disposed of. The requirement regarding the size of the repository thus became definable - an essential basis for the credibility of the procedure and the acceptance of a future site. Furthermore, the decision to phase out pacified a major social conflict. The search for a final repository is no longer a prerequisite (the so-called proof of disposal) for the continued operation or new construction of nuclear power plants. Instead, the search for a final repository is the necessary last step to complete the phase-out of nuclear power use. A long-term extension of runtimes could revive social conflicts and challenge the cross-party consensus.